Through a systematic review of peer-reviewed and grey literature, this paper analyzes evidence of the livelihood impacts of Payments for Environmental Services (PES). Forty-six studies assessed PES livelihood impacts. The assessments presented more positive livelihood impacts than negative ones, focusing on financial benefits. Nonmonetary and non-material impacts of PES were largely understudied. Most reviews focused on ES providers, hindering the understanding of broader societal impacts. The review yielded examples where participants lost from their participation or where improvements in one livelihood dimension paralleled deterioration in another. Consequently, we identified key research gaps in: i) understanding the social and cultural impacts of PES, ii) evaluating environmental and economic additionality from improving other ES at the expense of cultural ones, iii) and assessing PES impacts in terms of trade-offs between multiple livelihood dimensions. Moreover, increased knowledge is needed on the impact of PES on changes in household expenditure and choice, and on trade-offs between household income and inequality in ES provider communities. Finally, if PES schemes are implemented to sustainably improve livelihoods, targeting disaggregated populations, understanding equity and social power relations within and between ES providers and users, and better monitoring and evaluation systems that consider locally relevant livelihood dimensions are needed. operation agencies when providing support to PES (Wunder, 2008) .
Introduction
The first experiences with Payments for Environmental Services (PES) date back to the 1990s. PES are agreements between providers and users of environmental services 1 (ES) in which users who benefit from ES compensate providers who maintain them off-site. In the agreement, ES providers must take action to maintain and improve ES provision, or reverse their degradation, to achieve conservation goals (Wunder, 2015) . PES rely on the idea that positive environmental externalities can be internalized by creating appropriate markets and market instruments such as conditional rewards (Pearce and Turner, 1990) . Wunder (2015) redefined PES as voluntary transactions (not necessarily market-based) between service users and providers (not limited to markets or individuals) to generate off-site services (benefits received off-site that cannot be otherwise charged). These transactions are conditional on agreed rules of natural resource management. Other mainstreamed definitions rely on the incremental provision of environmental services (Sommerville et al., 2009; Tacconi, 2012) or on incentives to align individual/collective land-use decisions and social interest by transferring resources between social actors . In practice, most PES schemes do not follow the original Coasean concept where externalities are best dealt with through private negotiations (Martin-Ortega et al., 2012; Schomers and Matzdorf, 2013) . Some definitions reflect how PES were designed in practice. For example, reward-based conceptualizations include pro-poor or fairness objectives as part of the PES definition criteria (Bulte et al., 2008; Iftikhar et al., 2007; Van Noordwijk et al., 2007) . This implies a synergy between socioeconomic and environmental impacts, usually assumed by nongovernmental organizations, donors, and international co-However, this assumption has seldom been assessed (Pagiola et al., 2005; Pattanayak et al., 2010) nor, more in general, has the link between well-being and environmental indicators (Cruz-Garcia et al., 2017) .
The effectiveness of PES in achieving multiple objectives simultaneously is debatable (Muradian et al., 2013; Wunder, 2013) .
Few studies have explored or proved the synergies between PES and livelihood outcomes (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002; Pagiola et al., 2005; Wunder, 2008; Tallis et al., 2008) . Certainly, assessing the socioeconomic impacts of PES is complex and requires evaluation across a range of actors -ES providers, direct users, and beyond (Grieg-Gran et al., 2005; Hegde and Bull, 2011) and time scales. Systematic monitoring and evaluation of PES, including their long-term environmental and livelihood effects, lag behind (Ezzine- De-Blas et al., 2016; Hejnowicz et al., 2014) .
Therefore, understanding to what extent and under what conditions PES schemes have successfully improved livelihoods is urgently needed to guide future PES implementation with synergistic environmental and livelihood goals.
In this paper, we examine published evidence of the livelihood impacts of PES, based on a systematic review of peer-reviewed and grey literature available online. As different authors refer to impacts on poverty, well-being, equity, and so on, we use the term livelihoods as an umbrella definition. Using the sustainable livelihoods approach, we define livelihoods as capabilities and means of living embedded within a paradigm of equity and sustainability (Chambers and Conway, 1992) . We analyze PES impacts in relation to different dimensions that contribute to sustainable livelihoods, including but not limited to financial, social, human, physical, and natural capital. Our review aims to answer two research questions: (1) what is the evidence of livelihood impacts of PES schemes evaluated in the literature? and (2) what are the current gaps in the generation of evidence of livelihood impacts of PES schemes?
Contextual Background
According to the literature, the positive effects of PES include increased land tenure security (Lawlor et al., 2013) , financial gains, income stability, and diversification (Pagiola et al., 2005; Wunder, 2008) . Additionally, PES can generate health benefits through improving and stabilizing sources of drinking water (Wunder, 2008) . PES can provide recreation benefits, cultural opportunities, strengthened social networks and institutions, and economic growth (Iftikhar et al., 2007; Tacconi et al., 2013) .
PES can also generate negative livelihood impacts. Constraints to resource-extractive activities may lead to lower local production, price increases, and market dependency (Pagiola et al., 2005; Wunder, 2008) . Social tensions can arise from unequal benefit appropriation (Grieg-Gran et al., 2005; Wunder, 2008) . PES-induced land-use restrictions can affect cultural traditions (Trac et al., 2013; Yang et al., 2013) . Disbursement of payments only in the first years of PES scheme operation can affect income stability in the long term Tacconi et al., 2013) .
Previous reviews that analyzed livelihood impacts, among other aspects of PES, are available. In their review of REDD+ schemes, Lawlor et al. (2013) find that, despite the lack of robust evidence, these incentives improved land tenure security and decision-making power but provided moderate income gains. According to Leimona et al. (2009) , low population density in ES provider areas and low opportunity and transaction costs determine significant effects on rural income. Tacconi et al. (2013) illustrate that several PES schemes strengthened local institutions and community engagement with local government, and expanded farmers' networks. Samii et al. (2014) reported trade-offs between conservation and poverty reduction goals, but identified only two rigorous studies on livelihood impacts of PES. Hejnowicz et al. (2014) analyzed the conditions under which PES achieved multiple objectives. Börner et al. (2017) highlighted an important gap in the analysis of trade-offs between PES ecological performance and social outcomes. Calvet-Mir et al. (2015) highlighted the need to generate more evidence through systematic reviews to foster comparable analyses on PES scheme design and implementation. We address this by a systematic analysis of the published evidence of livelihood impacts of PES. While previous reviews focused on defined geographic or economic areas, outcomes, types of PES, or PES features, we provide a global search of PES evaluations that report any livelihood impact. We go beyond previous reviews by focusing only on livelihood impacts and comparing positive and negative impacts on disaggregated actors. We do not use a specific definition of PES and include all PES schemes defined as such in the publications found. Our analysis addresses the gap between PES theory and practice to contribute to ongoing debates on the role of PES in livelihood improvement, and the challenges of designing PES for this purpose.
Methodology
We systematically reviewed peer-reviewed publications and grey literature, following the PRISMA guidelines (Moher et al., 2009) . A comprehensive search for peer-reviewed studies on the livelihood impacts of PES was performed using the online SciVerse Scopus (title, abstract, and keywords search) and Thomson Reuter's Web of Science search engine (title search, topic search). We did not specify document type, language, year of publication, or study region. The search terms used were "payments or rewards", AND "environmental or ecosystem services", AND "impact*", AND "evaluation or assessment".
According to the Greynet.org definition, we included the following types of grey literature: institutional reports, working papers, consultant reports, non-peer-reviewed book chapters, and conference proceedings. We consulted the following databases: Agricola, 3ie, Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab, Grey Literature Report, OpenGrey, OAIster, and Google. Given the different archiving systems of these databases, the search terms used were "payments or rewards for environmental or ecosystem services" AND "impact".
We first searched all databases in April 2016 and then reran the whole search in January 2018 to update the analysis (Appendix A).
After removing duplicates and reading through all 1268 titles, we screened 885 records, of which we identified 74 eligible for full-text assessment. We excluded studies that reported only on the environmental impacts of PES or focused on the design, planning, frameworks, and concepts related to PES or other topics. We also excluded review papers in favor of studies that provided an in-depth analysis and evaluation of the livelihood impacts of specific PES schemes. The final sample of documents eligible for full-text review had 46 publications. We analyzed them in terms of who gained and who lost from PES implementation and whether they participated (as ES providers, users, or buyers) or not in the PES. We highlighted methods to evaluate impacts and sources of data collection. Fig. 1 shows the methodological approach, while Appendix A details the databases consulted, the search terms used per database, and the final number of records included after removing duplicates.
Results
We briefly overview here the general trends of the studies reviewed. Appendix B details the 46 publications, while Appendix C provides a synthetic table with the main characteristics of the PES schemes they evaluated. Appendix D provides more detail about geographical distribution of the studies, key features of the PES evaluated, and the methods used by the studies to evaluate them. Finally, Appendix E shows the positive and negative impacts of PES in the studies reviewed, the method they used to analyze them, who gains and who loses from positive and negative impacts.
Forty-six publications (or 5% of the publications screened) evaluated livelihood impacts. Seventy-eight percent of the publications were peer-reviewed articles; 20 publications (43%) evaluated PES schemes in Latin America, while 18 studies assessed PES in Asia (Fig. 2) and 8 in Africa.
The 46 studies evaluated 24 PES or PES-like schemes. In 17 PES schemes, the incentive mechanisms were cash transfers, followed by a combination of in-kind and cash transfer (6), and one scheme providing only in-kind compensation. ES buyers were mainly governments (62%), and ES providers were individual households (15 PES), entire communities (7), or both (2).
The studies applied mostly qualitative (43%) and quantitative methods (30%), half with counterfactuals (participants vs non-participants) ( Fig. 3A and C) . The most common data collection methods were surveys (63%) interviews (39%), and document reviews (36%) ( Fig. 3B ). Livelihood impacts were often analyzed through tests of differences (30%) and descriptive statistics (26%) (Fig. 3D ). Fig. 4 shows the number of studies that assessed each indicator and the number of impacts found for each. Seventy-eight percent of the studies, both counterfactual and non-counterfactual, focused on financial impacts of PES, followed by employment, agricultural production, and physical capital. Few publications analyzed non-monetary and non-material indicators, including social, human, and natural capital. Only 4 studies (all non-counterfactuals) assessed PES impacts in terms of cultural capital.
Livelihood Impacts
Our review found more nuanced and varied livelihood impacts than those presented in Section 2 (Appendix D). All studies except two Arriagada et al., 2018) found changes in livelihoods due to program participation. Non-counterfactual studies highlighted more negative impacts (39 impacts: 12 qualitative studies, 3 mixed methods studies) than counterfactual assessments (16 impacts: 5 quantitative studies, 1 qualitative study, 5 mixed methods studies). In total, 33 studies analyzed more than one livelihood dimension. Out of these, 10 reported only positive impacts, while 23 (9 counterfactual) reported positive impacts in certain dimensions and negative impacts in others. For instance, while PES participants derived benefits in social capital and employment, some lost benefits in another, such as income (Locatelli et al., 2008) . Conversely, participants of a PES scheme in Cambodia derived benefits in multiple livelihood dimensions such as income, agricultural production, and food security simultaneously (Clements and Milner-Gulland, 2015) .
Financial Capital and Flows
Thirty-six studies analyzed the financial impacts of PES, with mixed conclusions. Out of these, four did not find any change in financial capital or flows.
Out of the 32 studies that found any change in the financial dimension, 27 reported on variations in household income or on the share of income deriving from the PES payments. Twenty studies only found income increases due to PES implementation, while five only reported income losses. Those who gained were usually households that provided ES. Similarly, those who lost were individual providers (7) or provider communities (3). Importantly, four evaluations reported both income gains and losses, but for different types of households.
Given the predominance of assessments reporting income changes, we illustrate the heterogeneity of indicators used, methods, and findings in Appendix F. Ten papers reported the share of income from PES, G. Blundo-Canto et al. Ecological Economics 149 (2018) 160-183 while 12 quantify the income change due to PES. PES-induced income changes varied considerably, with income increases ranging from 14% (Miranda et al., 2003) to as much as 400% (Yang et al., 2013) and potential decreases of about 60% (Leimona et al., 2010) . Overall, few studies quantified income changes. For instance, only four counterfactuals (Hegde and Bull, 2011; Liang et al., 2012; Zheng et al., 2013; Jack and Cardona-Santos, 2017) quantified PES effects on comparable income indicators (household income). All except one found significant positive effects. As for specific PES schemes, three counterfactual studies (Li et al., 2011; Liang et al., 2012; Yin et al., 2014) attributed income increases of different intensity to the Sloping Land Conversion Program (SLCP) in China. Four non-counterfactual studies (Liu et al., 2008; Trac et al., 2013; He and Sikor, 2015; Qu et al., 2017) also reported income increases. Trac et al. (2013) reported negative impacts of the SLCP on income due to a lack of markets for promoted cash crops, while Liang et al. (2012) found income decreases for households with children but without elderly.
In the Paddy Land-to-Dry Land (PLDL) program in China, increased earnings from other sources balanced the decrease in agricultural income for participants compared with non-participants (Zheng et al., 2013) .
Three non-counterfactual studies on the Natural Forest Conservation Program (NFCP) in China presented multifaceted effects. ES providers' income increased, but whether these effects were attributable to the NFCP was unclear (Yang et al., 2013) . Conversely, the NFCP did not compensate for the loss of income induced by logging and grazing bans (Cao, 2011) . Moreover, while ES providers gained from additional income sources, forestry workers in provider communities, who depended on timber harvesting, suffered large economic losses (Liu et al., 2008) . In Costa Rica, two counterfactual studies reported income increases for ES providers (Cole, 2010; Miranda et al., 2003) . Two non-counterfactual studies 2 (Locatelli et al., 2008; Porras et al., 2013) found that activities linked to reforestation helped diversify the income of participants. However, smallholders and the working class suffered negative short-term financial impacts compared with richer landowners (Locatelli et al., 2008) .
Concerning the Programme for Hydrological Environmental Services (PSAH) in Mexico, one counterfactual study reported improved access to credit (Alix-Garcia et al., 2014) while a second found no improvement in the financial well-being of participants (Scullion et al., G. Blundo-Canto et al. Ecological Economics 149 (2018) 160-183 2011). Non-counterfactual studies reported mixed results. Corbera (2010) found moderate income increases for individual PSAH providers. Income inequality decreased between ES providers, although widening the poverty gap with non-providers in the same communities (García-Amado et al., 2011) . For the Socio Bosque scheme in Ecuador, a counterfactual study (Raes et al., 2014) reported income increases for individual providers, while two non-counterfactual studies reported increases especially for small landowners (Bremer et al., 2014) and income diversification at the community level (Farley et al., 2011) . A non-counterfactual assessment of the Pimampiro PES in Ecuador found that powerful households gained the most, which reinforced unequal resource allocation (Rodríguez de Francisco et al., 2013) .
The Olare Orok Conservancy PES in Kenya prevented a larger share of participants from slipping below the poverty line compared with non-participants, but their income sources decreased due to crowding of pastoral land (Osano et al., 2013) . Additionally, payments reduced income inequality among participants, but broadened the income gap with non-participants.
Two counterfactual studies on the Nhambita Community Carbon Project in Mozambique reported income increases for ES providers (Hegde and Bull, 2011; Jindal, 2010) .
A counterfactual study (Kwayu et al., 2017) of the Equitable Payments for Watershed Services (EPWS) in Tanzania reported income increases for ES providers, while an early non-counterfactual study (Lopa et al., 2012) , reported that participants in the program increased 3.5 fold within the first year probably because of the financial incentives.
According to non-counterfactual studies, three PES schemes led to income losses for participants due to land-use restrictions (Rodríguez de Francisco et al., 2013; Soriaga and Annawi, 2010) and wildlife-induced damage to crops and livestock (Naidoo et al., 2011) .
Four counterfactual studies reported positive impacts on household expenditure per capita of ES providers, while one reported no change. A non-counterfactual study (Ibarra et al., 2011) found that households in a Mexican community spent a larger share of their income on lowerquality food because of lower local agricultural productivity due to reduced agricultural area and shortened fallow cycles.
Employment
Seventeen studies, of which 12 were counterfactual, reported changes in employment due to PES implementation. Seven counterfactual studies and two non-counterfactual studies found that employment opportunities increased in ES provider communities. Two counterfactual studies (Wang et al., 2017; Uchida et al., 2009) reported increased employment opportunities for non-participants. Conversely, Jack and Cardona-Santos (2017) found that households randomly assigned to PES contracts had higher labor constraints for casual off-farm labor than those who auctioned for the contract, suggesting that the contract would have been more beneficial to self-selected households. In Mexico, labor costs of PES-induced land management changes were large compared to PSAH payments (Alix-Garcia et al., 2014) . Yin et al. (2014) reported declining on-farm employment but increasing off-farm employment for participants of the SLCP compared with non-participants, while a non-counterfactual study (Trac et al., 2013) reported a shift to illegal timber harvesting. According to Uchida et al. (2009) , the largest impact of the SLCP was increased off-farm employment of younger households or those with liquidity constrained prior to the program.
A counterfactual (Miranda et al., 2003) and a non-counterfactual study (Locatelli et al., 2008) reported increased employment related to product transportation and transformation and additional temporary labor due to the PSA in Costa Rica. Similarly, according to a noncounterfactual study, the NFCP in China resulted in a transfer of labor to other sectors and a shift from logging to forest management and plantation farming (Liu et al., 2008) .
Agricultural Production
Twelve studies, of which seven were counterfactual, reported impacts on agricultural production. Positive impacts reported by counterfactual studies included higher crop harvests or yields (Clements and Milner-Gulland, 2015; Kwayu et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2017; Beauchamp et al., 2018) , bigger cattle herds (Alix-Garcia et al., 2014) , and slight increases in commercial crops (Jindal, 2010) . Non-counterfactual studies found increased grain productivity for households in SLCP communities (Cao, 2011; Liu et al., 2008) and increased investments in agricultural production for Socio Bosque participants (Bremer et al., 2014) . Negative impacts in terms of reduced crop yields for participants were reported in a counterfactual study by Hegde and Bull (2011) , and by two non-counterfactual studies in terms of reduced agricultural or livestock production (Molina-Murillo et al., 2014; Bremer et al., 2014) .
Physical Capital
According to counterfactual studies, PES payments contributed to the construction of a school and clinic (Jindal, 2010) , a nursery (Leimona et al., 2010) , and forest road improvements (Wang et al., 2017) . Non-counterfactual studies reported that PES implementation led to investments in local power grids (Yang et al., 2013) , road protection from erosion (Soriaga and Annawi, 2010) , greenhouses (Corbera, 2010) , and community infrastructure (Molina-Murillo et al., 2014) . However, according to Cao (2011) and Liu et al. (2008) (both non-counterfactual), decreased tax revenues due to logging restrictions reduced local government investment in China.
Poverty
Five counterfactual studies reported improvements in poverty indices for participants. The Costa Rica PSA reduced poverty among households in high-slope areas with low opportunity costs and low deforestation threat (Robalino et al., 2014) , but increased poverty in low-slope areas with higher opportunity costs. The PSAH in Mexico generated significant but small poverty increases (Sims and Alix-Garcia, 2017) in areas where larger shares of the population participated in the program, and for longer periods (Alix-Garcia et al., 2015) . The economic status (basic necessities) of ES providers in Cambodia improved compared to non-participants (Clements and Milner-Gulland, 2015; Beauchamp et al., 2018) .
Three additional counterfactual studies analyzed poverty, but found no significant impacts (Arriagada et al., 2015; Diswandi, 2017; Arriagada et al., 2018) .
Land Tenure
Two counterfactual studies reported increased security against squatters (Miranda et al., 2003) and redistribution of forestlands with long-term secure tenure (Wang et al., 2017) . Non-counterfactual studies reported increased land tenure security for participants by creating communal wildlife conservancies (Naidoo et al., 2011) , tenure regularization (Porras et al., 2013) , and perceived higher land security (Bremer et al., 2014) .
Social Capital
Twelve studies, of which four were counterfactuals (i.e. Leimona et al., 2010; Miranda et al., 2003; Kwayu et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2017) , reported mixed results in terms of changes in social capital. PES schemes helped to build a connection with local governments and establish agricultural cooperative organizations in China (Wang et al., 2017) , while increasing trust and cohesion among participants in Tanzania (Kwayu et al., 2017) . The Costa Rica PSA increased voluntary agreements, institutional dialogue, and coordination (Miranda et al., 2003) , as well as inclusion of marginalized actors according to a noncounterfactual study (Porras et al., 2013) . Leimona et al. (2010) found that interactions between participants of a PES in Indonesia and external stakeholders increased, but created an exclusive group vis-à-vis non-participants.
Non-counterfactual studies reported both positive and negative impacts on social capital. Bartels et al. (2010) found that Proambiente participants in Brazil influenced state projects through strengthened networks. The Pimampiro PES in Ecuador reinforced unequal power relations within communities and between service users and providers (Rodríguez de Francisco et al., 2013) . Corbera (2010) found that the establishment of forest management groups in Mexico translated into community commitment to control damaging activities in forest areas, but created conflict between formal and informal rights holders. Locatelli et al. (2008) and Molina-Murillo et al. (2014) found that the Costa Rica PSA improved governance and increased local institutional support. Bremer et al. (2014) reported perceived improvements in community organization but potential conflicts over access to reserved land and Socio Bosque investment plans.
Human Capital
Out of eleven studies reporting human capital impacts, only one counterfactual study found negative impacts (Jindal, 2010) , in terms of increased workloads for women. Two counterfactual studies (Miranda et al., 2003; Scullion et al., 2011) and a non-counterfactual study (Corbera et al., 2009 ) reported increasing environmental awareness. Other counterfactual studies reported increased knowledge and skills in agriculture and forest management (Alix-Garcia et al., 2014; Kwayu et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2017) .
Natural Capital and Flows
According to counterfactual studies, positive impacts of PES in natural capital (as a livelihood dimension) included increased water availability for ES users (Zheng et al., 2013) , increased forest conservation linked to a conservation ethic (Scullion et al., 2011) , and improved knowledge and perception of environmental services (Arriagada et al., 2018) . Non-counterfactual studies reported improved perception of the environment (Locatelli et al., 2008) and of the sustainability of conservation efforts (Bremer et al., 2014) , but also lower deforestation due to lower fuelwood use (Yang et al., 2013) .
Food Security
Three counterfactual studies (Clements and Milner-Gulland, 2015; Alix-Garcia et al., 2015; Kwayu et al., 2017) and two non-counterfactual studies (Naidoo et al., 2011; Ibarra et al., 2011) measured the effects of PES on food security, focusing on food consumption. Households participating in the Ibis Rice program were more food secure (Clements and Milner-Gulland, 2015) or had twice per person consumption (Naidoo et al., 2011) than non-participants. Alix-Garcia et al. (2015) reported increased food consumption for poor households. Kwayu et al. (2017) found increased ability of participants to meet household food needs. Conversely, Ibarra et al. (2011) found only negative impacts, as land-use restrictions and hunting prohibitions increased market dependency.
Cultural Capital
Four non-counterfactual studies addressed culture-related impacts and all reported negative effects for provider communities. Forest-use restrictions affected local customs and identity (Yang et al., 2013) or hindered traditional practices (Trac et al., 2013) in China. Bans on hunting and agricultural land uses for ES providers altered traditional resource management and food systems, leading to degraded nutrition of indigenous communities in Mexico (Ibarra et al., 2011) . Clearance restrictions disrupted fallow and rotation cycles, thus neglecting traditional practices and community identities in Ecuador (Rodríguez de Francisco et al., 2013) .
Health
Only one study (non-counterfactual) discussed the health impacts of PES schemes, reporting reduced water-related diseases for households in provider communities (Soriaga and Annawi, 2010) .
Benefit Appropriation and Opportunity Costs
In four studies, poor and better-off households, smallholders, and larger landowners participated and benefited almost equally from PES schemes (Cole, 2010; Martin et al., 2014; Naidoo et al., 2011; Yin et al., 2014) . Conversely, other studies found that some households had better access to PES than others. These included male-headed and richer households (Hegde and Bull, 2011; Liang et al., 2012) , more food-secure or better-off households (Clements and Milner-Gulland, 2015; Beauchamp et al., 2018) , or those with a certain land area (Farley et al., 2011; Lopa et al., 2012; Miranda et al., 2003; Porras et al., 2013; Raes et al., 2014) . Non-fully voluntary participation was reported in China (Li, 2009) and in Ecuador (Rodríguez de Francisco et al., 2013) .
Nineteen studies discussed the opportunity costs associated with original land uses. For instance, SLCP payments were higher than the opportunity costs of retired land (Liang et al., 2012) , while the payments of the PSAH in Mexico were lower than alternative incomes (Alix-Garcia et al., 2014; García-Amado et al., 2011; Scullion et al., 2011) . Martin et al. (2014) and Raes et al. (2014) reported cases in which an undifferentiated payment rate independent of individual opportunity costs was deemed the most equitable choice. Arriagada et al. (2015) found that >50% of the participants in the Costa Rica PSA mentioned that environmental protection rather than financial gain motivated them to enroll in the program.
Discussion
Despite the popularity of PES and the plethora of publications on the subject, this systematic review of peer-reviewed and grey literature of PES impacts found only 46 studies that assessed PES livelihood impacts, out of 885 screened. Many PES schemes have reached implementation maturity slowly, limiting evaluation opportunities. Despite the limited number of publications found, they provide nuanced evidence of the livelihood impacts of PES, and highlight PES design and evaluation gaps and opportunities.
Design of Assessments
Different methods sometimes yielded opposite or mixed results for the same PES scheme. For instance, in qualitative methods, more indepth discussions with individual participants may yield more negative impacts as participants have the opportunity to express their discomfort about program participation or the effects on livelihood dimensions, such as social and cultural, seldom captured in quantitative assessments. Another partial explanation is that assessments from the ecological and economic literature more often use quantitative methods, focusing less on the sociological and political processes affected by PES, more often captured in the social sciences. The low use of mixed methods reduces the opportunity to understand how contextual factors, power relations, and equity issues determine multiple PES impacts for heterogeneous populations.
The choice to apply a counterfactual evaluation or not is also relevant. Evaluations based on counterfactual analysis aim to provide us with a robust understanding of the impacts of an intervention on participants compared with non-participants. This is true when the intervention is relatively straightforward, such as PES schemes based purely on cash-transfers (or only one modality of compensation) for a clearly defined and relatively homogeneous population. In the counterfactual studies reviewed, the quality of sample selection was not always clear, hindering judgment on group comparability. We found mixed results for income effects assessed with counterfactual and non-counterfactual methods for the same PES cases (e.g. in China and Mexico). Measuring income increases requires proper counterfactuals to determine the extent of income change actually attributable to PES and if this change is significant compared to non-participants. At the same time, quantitative methods should be complemented by qualitative methods to understand contextual factors and processes that affect those changes. For instance, in Costa Rica, non-counterfactual methods were useful to understand why larger landholders benefit more from PES than smallholders (e.g. Locatelli et al., 2008) . For some aspects, non-counterfactual methods that reconstruct baseline information and ask PES participants how the initial situation has changed after PES implementation can be useful to evaluate variations in dimensions such as infrastructure and land tenure security, if these were benefits clearly agreed during PES negotiation. In these cases, the causality between PES intervention and outcome is more straightforward as it is directly dependent on PES implementation and achievement of the respective commitments.
Who Benefits and How?
Our review showed that PES assessments focus on ES providers and on financial impacts. Only one study evaluated the effects on ES users. Few reported effects on non-participants, who experienced higher income inequality or lower income than PES participants, or communities suffering from reduced public investment or employment. The prevailing focus on ES providers thwarts the understanding of broader societal impacts, including on communities, non-participants, institutions, and ES buyers. In terms of "losers", they were often ES providers experiencing income decreases due to PES-induced restrictions. However, the consequences of PES schemes cannot be fully captured in terms of income as its translation into enhanced livelihoods is not linear .
This relates to another key aspect to understand how ES providers benefit from PES: in theory, if payments offset or exceed opportunity costs of conserving or better managing ES-providing areas, then PES could help to alleviate economic poverty. However, only half of the studies discussed opportunity costs, thus hampering our ability to discern the net income effects of PES (Calvet-Mir et al., 2015) . Indeed, financial benefits of PES are not always the main motivation of participants. Participants enrolled in PES initiatives that were not necessarily compensating the opportunity costs (Beauchamp et al., 2018; Arriagada et al., 2015) . Other non-economic reasons may explain enrollment such as conservation ethics, improvements in human and social assets, but also peer pressure or coercion (Grieg-Gran et al., 2005; Kronenberg and Hubacek, 2013) .
Evidence of impacts in non-financial capital is mixed and contextdependent. For example, only a few studies reported increased land tenure security, often considered an important livelihood impact of PES (Lawlor et al., 2013) . At the same time, our review yielded cases in which access rules and land-use restrictions led to segregation between powerful groups and less influential farmers, thus reducing community cohesion. Significantly, such results reflect inadequate identification of values inherent to ES, as the value system of a community might not identify with standard opportunity cost assessments.
Current Gaps
The empirical basis of the livelihood impacts of PES, although increasing, is still inadequate and seldom comparable, thus limiting the capacity of science to conclude about PES impacts under diverse socioecological systems.
In terms of PES design, we found key gaps for generating and assessing PES livelihood impacts. Sound monitoring and evaluation systems are urgently needed (Ezzine- De-Blas et al., 2016; Hejnowicz et al., 2014) , and should aim to overcome the disconnect between short-term payments and long-term agreements (Quintero and Pareja, 2015; Tacconi et al., 2013) .
Limitations in evaluation design hinder the assessment of overall and disaggregated societal benefits of PES. Sound evaluations that complement qualitative and quantitative methods, applying rigorous counterfactuals (e.g. Gertler et al., 2016) whenever appropriate, and disentangling disaggregated PES impacts on different types of ES providers, users, and non-participants are needed. Additionally, the identification of local livelihood indicators can unearth contextual values and priorities, allowing holistic and context-relevant PES design and implementation (Blundo-Canto et al., 2016) .
When counterfactual evaluation is not appropriate, fuzzy multicriteria analysis provides meaningful results, such as those provided by Locatelli et al. (2008) , although quantification might be challenging. Other approaches, such as process tracing, contribution analysis, or developmental evaluation, that take into account complexity and systemic change, can be applied (Bamberger et al., 2010; Hearn and Buffardi, 2016; Patton, 2014) .
It is also important to consider contextual evolutions over the long term for counterfactual evaluation to be robust (Beauchamp et al., 2018) , acknowledging that socioeconomic characteristics usually change slowly and incrementally (Arriagada et al., 2015) . Analysis of past trends and evolution of key variables in the contexts analyzed can support the design of more appropriate and realistic evaluations. Moreover, PES evaluations should consider the continuity, duration, and stability of financial incentives, which shape the sustainability of economic improvements achieved through PES.
From the economic benefits perspective, our review provided insights into under-researched aspects: i) the impact of PES on changes in household expenditure and choice and ii) the trade-off between individual household income and community inequality. Some studies showed that PES were used to purchase low-quality food to substitute food formerly produced in land set aside for conservation. This type of effect deserves more in-depth studies that take into account patterns of change comparing participants and non-participants. For the second aspect, some studies showed that while PES increase income for participating households, they could exacerbate the income gap with nonparticipants. This trade-off deserves greater attention for assessing overall equity effects of PES.
Better economic assessment of PES impacts should increase efforts on fuller accounting of opportunity costs and understanding the rationale behind PES participation decisions, coupling economic, environmental, and cultural considerations (Corbera et al., 2007) . These considerations are key when designing and negotiating PES. When opportunity costs are low and more profitable landuse alternatives are lacking, enrollment is more likely even despite low payment rates (Arriagada et al., 2009) . In this respect, an opportunity exists for agricultural research in testing alternatives that increase productivity while reducing negative environmental externalities. This may reduce the negative impacts associated with reduced agricultural production reported in some of the reviewed studies. Additionally, opportunity costs should be periodically re-assessed to adapt payments to changing costs in time.
From a theoretical perspective, non-monetary and non-material livelihood aspects are understudied in PES evaluations. The few studies that reported increased food security for ES providers consider only food availability, a limited view of food security, which is multidimensional (FAO, 2011) . The bias towards food availability rather than food quality, access, or stability reflects trends in ES research .
Our review confirms that there is little evidence of the social impacts of PES (Hejnowicz et al., 2014) . Cultural impacts are almost ignored. The studies that analyzed these impacts provided a more complex picture of individual and community-level changes generated by PES. Additionally, half of the studies reviewed reported trade-offs between impacts in different livelihood dimensions, while ten reported positive increases in multiple dimensions simultaneously.
Therefore, three research areas deserve particular attention: i) understanding the social and cultural impacts of PES, ii) assessing environmental and economic additionality from improving other ES at the expense of cultural ones, iii) and evaluating PES impacts in terms of trade-offs and synergies between multiple livelihood dimensions.
Conclusions
This systematic review provides empirical evidence of the livelihood impacts of PES schemes and identifies current gaps in their design and evaluation. The studies reviewed presented more positive livelihood impacts than negative ones, often focused on economic benefits for ES providers. Nonetheless, a third of the studies assessed multiple livelihood dimensions, out of each half that reported trade-offs between dimensions.
Some studies found that diverse motivations beyond economic rationale can determine the decision to participate in PES. PES design and implementation should carefully consider why and how people participate, to ensure equity and sustainability. Additionally, a better understanding of social and cultural aspects is important for PES efficiency and power-sensitive analysis (Van Hecken et al., 2015) , by accounting for their institutional aspects (Corbera et al., 2009) , equity considerations (Pascual et al., 2014) , and non-material and non-economic benefits (Chan et al., 2012) .
PES initiatives were originally designed as conservation incentives generating environmental additionality under cost-effective and economically efficient conditions (Wunder, 2015) . In practice, they are often implemented to attain pro-poor impacts, while environmental objectives might be secondary (Rosa da Conceição et al., 2015) . Certainly, poverty exacerbates environmental degradation and environmental degradation exacerbates poverty (Duraiappah, 1998) . Therefore, environmental conservation and poverty alleviation initiatives should aim to be synergistic. Along these lines, it is necessary to ensure that PES schemes, while improving environmental service delivery, do not worsen poverty in the places where they are implemented. This has major policy implications, for instance, that could re-shape how institutions work in a way that promotes interdisciplinary interactions between policymakers and decision makers to create regulations that address both environmental degradation and poverty, involving new ES buyers interested in societal impacts and ensuring efficient use of public funds. In terms of PES design, this would translate into better planning, monitoring, and evaluation (Le Velly and Dutilly, 2016 ) that respond to the objectives and inner logic of the intervention (e.g. purely environmental, purely focused on poverty alleviation, seeking to maximize both dimensions, and so on). Certainly, the effectiveness and efficiency of PES are also a result of design choices (Engel et al., 2008; Wunder, 2015) .
To integrate environmental with socioeconomic and equity objectives, PES design should target disaggregated populations, looking for synergies between environmental sustainability and livelihoods (Raworth, 2012) and evaluating livelihood impacts adjusted by the stability of PES agreements. Synergies and trade-offs between, and within, livelihood and environmental dimensions should be clear when negotiating PES, enabling transparent mechanisms that distribute PES benefits equitably (Ingram et al., 2014) . Assessment of power relations between ES providers and users, but also within provider communities (Tristán-Febres et al., 2018) , would help avoid unequal benefit appropriation. This is seldom considered in PES design and is a significant omission in ES research (Berbés-Blázquez et al., 2016) . Disaggregated assessments that account for equity and distributional effects, along with environmental and livelihood co-benefits and trade-offs, as well as understanding how local communities define their well-being to ensure locally relevant outcomes are a priority for PES research, design, and implementation that aim to achieve equitable and sustainable livelihood improvement.
Acknowledgments
We thank the two anonymous reviewers who helped us considerably improve the paper. This research was supported by the CGIAR Research Program on Water, Land and Ecosystems (WLE) and CGIAR Fund donors.
Appendix A. Search Terms and Results

Database
Search Terms Fields Timespan Records identified
Records included after removing duplicates
Scopus TITLE-ABS-KEY ( payments for ecosystem servic a OR payments for environment a servic a AND impact a )
Web of Science "payment a for ecosystem servic a " or "payment a for environment a servic a " and impact a Title 05/01/ 2018 249 3 (("payment for ecosystem servic a " OR "payment for environment a servic a ") NEAR/5 (impact OR evaluat a OR assess a )) Topic 05/01/ 2018 29 0
"reward a for ecosystem servic a " or "reward a for environment a servic a " and impact a Title 05/01/ 2018 1 0 (("reward for ecosystem servic a " OR "reward for environment a servic a ") NEAR/5 (impact OR evaluat a OR assess a )) Topic 05/01/ 2018 0 0 Agricola USDA ("payments for ecosystem services") OR ("payment for ecosystem services") OR ("payments for environmental services") OR ("payment for environmental services") Keywords anywhere 07/01/ 2018 448 4 (" rewards for ecosystem services ") OR (" reward for ecosystem services ") OR (" rewards for environmental services ") OR (" reward for environmental services ") Ecological Economics 149 (2018) 160-183 Appendix D. Descriptive Analysis
D.1. Geographical Distribution
Most publications (n = 36) are peer-reviewed articles, followed by book chapters (5), reports (1), one conference paper and a discussion paper. Twenty assessments focus on PES schemes in Latin America Eight concerned the Mexican Payments for Hydrological Environmental Services (PSAH) (Alix-Garcia et al., 2015 , 2014 Corbera et al., 2009; García-Amado et al., 2011; Ibarra et al., 2011; Scullion et al., 2011; Arriagada et al., 2018; Sims and Alix-Garcia, 2017) . Seven studies in Costa Rica, evaluated the national PES (PSA) (Locatelli et al., 2008; Miranda et al., 2003; Porras et al., 2013; Robalino et al., 2014; Molina-Murillo et al., 2014; Arriagada et al., 2015) , and one the Sistemas Agroforestales (SAF) (Cole, 2010) . In Ecuador, three studies evaluated the Socio Bosque PES scheme (Farley et al., 2011; Raes et al., 2014; Bremer et al., 2014) , one the Comuna Zuleta PES (Farley et al., 2011) , and one the Pimampiro PES (Rodríguez de Francisco et al., 2013) . One study in Brazil evaluated the Proambiente program (Bartels et al., 2010) . Thirteen publications evaluated PES schemes in China, of which nine concerned the Sloping Land Conversion Program (SLCP) (Cao, 2011; Li et al., 2011; Li, 2009; Uchida et al., 2009; Liang et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2008; Trac et al., 2013; Yang et al., 2013; Yin et al., 2014; Zheng et al., 2013; He and Sikor, 2015; Qu et al., 2017) , three the Natural Forest Conservation Program (NFCP) (Cao, 2011; Liu et al., 2008; Yang et al., 2013) , one the Paddy Land-to-Dry Land (PLDL) program (Zheng et al., 2013) , and one the Changting County PES (Wang et al., 2017) . Two studies evaluated the Nhambita Community Carbon Project in Mozambique (Hegde and Bull, 2011; Jindal, 2010) , and two the Equitable Payments for Watershed Services (EPWS) in Tanzania (Lopa et al., 2012; Kwayu et al., 2017) . One study assessed a Tree planting scheme in Malawi (Jack and Cardona-Santos, 2017) , one the Olare Orok Conservancy PES in Kenya (Osano et al., 2013) , one a PES led by University of East Anglia in Rwanda , and one the Community-based natural resources management (CBNRM) program in Namibia (Naidoo et al., 2011) . Finally, two studies evaluated the Bird Nest protection, Ibis Rice, Ecotourism programs in Cambodia (Clements and Milner-Gulland, 2015; Beauchamp et al., 2018) , one the No fire bonus scheme in the Philippines (Soriaga and Annawi, 2010) , and two the Cidanau Watershed PES (Leimona et al., 2010) and the West Lombok PES (Diswandi, 2017) in Indonesia.
D.2. Buyers, Providers and Conditionality
Overall, the 46 studies evaluated 24 PES or PES-like schemes. We classified type of incentive according to the modality of payment: cash, cash with in-kind, or purely in-kind. We did not include capacity-building activities as in-kind payments unless explicitly identified as a feature of the agreement. In 17 out of these, the incentive mechanism were cash transfers, followed by a combination of cash and in-kind (6), or purely in-kind (1).
Specific in-kind compensation beyond cash payments included an annual in-kind subsidy of grain and free seedlings (SLCP); seedlings and technical assistance (Nhambita Community Carbon Project); technical assistance and long-term land use plans (Proambiente); inputs and training (Tree planting PES); green infrastructure (Changting Country PES); and timber tree planting (West Lombok PES). The "No-Fire Bonus scheme" in the Philippines only provided in-kind compensation (infrastructure).
The main ES buyers included governments (15 PES), followed by private companies (4), public water companies (3), an international research center and a university ES providers were most frequently individual households (16 PES), entire communities (5) or both (3).
Conditionality rules included conservation of wildlife (habitat protection, or relocation and exclusion of grazing) and natural resources (4), restoration or maintenance of forest or vegetation cover (4 and 3), agroforestry (3) and land use change (3).
Providers were mostly individual households (13 PES), entire communities (6) or both (2). Conditionality rules included conservation of wildlife and natural resources (4), restoration of forest or vegetation cover (4), agroforestry (3), maintenance of vegetation cover (3), land use change (3), forest protection (2), long term management plans (2), watershed protection (1), fire prevention (1), and conservation of land (1). Wildlife conservation entailed habitat protection or relocation and exclusion of grazing. In one PES scheme, conditionality was based on voluntary settlement relocation and livestock grazing exclusion inside a conservancy reserved to high-end wildlife tourism generating the payments for grazers (Osano et al., 2013) .
D.3. Environmental Services
Of the 24 PES schemes, ten focused on ES from managed forests, agro-forestry systems or forests in previous farmlands, which we categorized as agro-forestry ecosystems. Eleven PES schemes incentivized conservation of broadly defined natural forest ecosystems in areas threatened by human activities. One PES focused on High Andean grasslands (páramo), one on drylands, and one on wildlife conservancies. The 24 PES schemes targeted different environmental services as shown in Fig. A . Hydrological services, including sediment retention by preventing soil erosion, flood mitigation, and water quality, predominate (14 PES). Eleven PES schemes aimed at improving biodiversity conservation, while nine targeted carbon sequestration. Three schemes explicitly addressed cultural services (in Namibia, in Kenya and in Costa Rica), two provisioning services, one reduced landscape flammability and one desertification protection.
Thirteen PES schemes explicitly targeted environmental services bundles. For instance, the Costa Rica PSA included hydrological services, scenic beauty, carbon sequestration, and biodiversity protection, while the PSAH in Mexico addressed hydrological services and carbon sequestration. The SLPC targeted hydrological services, desertification protection and biodiversity. Proambiente considered carbon sequestration, biodiversity, hydrological services, and landscape flammability.
D.4. Measurement of Livelihood Impacts
The studies used different methods to measure livelihoods impacts, including purely qualitative (15), purely quantitative (14) and mixedmethods (14), of which 26 compared participants' to non-participants' impacts. Most often, data collection methods included surveys (29 studies), interviews (18), document reviews (13), and focus groups (9). Seventeen counterfactual studies and two non-counterfactuals explicitly reported sample selection methods. Counterfactual assessments usually applied quantitative or mixed methods (14 and 10 publications respectively). Mixedmethods studies used qualitative data to deepen understanding of livelihood impacts measured through quantitative analysis. Martin et al. (2014) , for instance, carried out interviews with participant and non-participant households in Rwanda to explore negative effects. Yang et al. (2013) conducted interviews to understand better the planning, implementation, evaluation and decision-making processes. Among qualitative studies, two carried out in-depth interviews and focus groups with both participants and non-participants. Two non-counterfactuals mentioned fieldwork activities but provided no further specification, while assignment to counterfactual was unclear in two studies.
Seven counterfactuals analyzed data from before and after PES implementation. For instance, Yin et al. (2014) adopted a trend study approach spanning ten years; Clements and Milner-Gulland (2015) used mixed-effects models on baseline data and repeated collections after 1 to 3 years of payment disbursement.
D.5. Livelihood Dimensions and Indicators
Livelihood impacts were mainly analyzed through tests of differences (11 counterfactual, 3 non-counterfactual), descriptive statistics (5 counterfactual, 7 non-counterfactual), description of data from document reviews (11 non-counterfactual), and multivariate regression analysis (8 counterfactuals).
In 78% of studies (18 counterfactual and 18 non-counterfactual analyses), impacts of PES were assessed in terms of the financial livelihood dimension. Financial capital and flows included income (30 studies), income sources (10), income inequality (4), household expenditure (6), access to credit (6), new investments (3), and land value (1). Other studies assessed changes in employment (12 counterfactual and 5 non-counterfactual), or changes in agricultural production (8 counterfactual and 5 non-counterfactual), and physical capital (3 counterfactual and 6 non-counterfactual). Indicators for changes in agricultural production included crop yields (8), crop production (5), and livestock production (2). Eight studies, all counterfactuals, evaluated impacts in terms of poverty. Poverty indicators included a basic necessities index (2 studies), an asset index (2), a basic food basket (1), a multidimensional poverty index (1), a poverty alleviation index (1), and a welfare indicator (1).
Few publications analyzed non-monetary and non-material indicators, including social (6 counterfactual and 9 non-counterfactual), human (7 counterfactual and 4 non-counterfactual) and natural capital (5 counterfactual and 4 non-counterfactual. Only non-counterfactual studies (4) assessed PES impacts in terms of cultural capital. Two counterfactual studies assessed changes in perceived quality of life. 
Appendix E. Positive and Negative Impacts of PES Reviewed
The following table shows the number of positive and negative impacts of PES in the studies reviewed for each livelihood dimension, the method used to analyze them, and who gains and who loses from positive and negative effects.
The method column provides a classification of the method according to the following abbreviations: Mix Count = mixed methods with counterfactual; Mix No Count = mixed methods without counterfactual; Qual Count = qualitative methods with counterfactual; Qual No Count = qualitative methods without counterfactual; Quant Count = quantitative methods with counterfactual; Quant No Count = quantitative methods without counterfactual.
Due to limitations of synthesizing multiple data in one table, there is no direct relationship between numbers in the method column and the columns who gains and who loses.
For clarity, we use abbreviations by type of stakeholders: P = providers; U = users; NP = non-participants. Farmers participating in the scheme have used the additional money to purchase clothes, assets, livestock, and to pay school fees Baseline income levels in the project area were too low to make these investments In July 2009 144 farmers had joined the scheme and were paid in May 2010 the equivalent of a total of USD 1639 as an annual payment to compensate for their efforts to improve land management, reduce erosion and improve water quality By May 2010 554 local farmers had become sellers in the scheme, increasing to 650 by November 2010 In July 2011, participating farmers were paid a total of USD 11,000 for their efforts to improve land As new people are still joining the scheme the expected payment in 2012 will be higher Miranda et al., 2003 share of income Descriptive statistics
Yes
The proportion of PES of average income for the two landowners who declared that PES represents their main activity is 37% For those who declared that PES is their second source of income the proportion is on average 12% Finally, for those who ranked PES as their third economic activity the average proportion is 18% It is worth noting that the program does not have a significant economic effect on small landowners (5% of their total income) Osano et al., 2013 Household income The US$340 million distributed between 1997 and 2012 is probably the PES's greatest direct socio-economic benefit The direct impact is highest in remote rural areas, where PES is one of the principal sources of cash for many participants Qu et al., 2017 Household income
Discussion of expert interviews
No
The majority of the experts stated that farmers received a higher income due to the compensation given by the government and other reasons This was different from other existing studies, which found that the subsidies were a significant source of income for the participants Raes et al., 2014 Share of income 
Yes
Of the 14 PES participants interviewed, representing 40% of the landowners paid by the PES scheme, all claimed the PES payments were < 3% of their total personal income Soriaga and Annawi, 2010 Village budget
Descriptive statistics
No
The scheme increased the financial capital of two villages, those with the lowest annual budgets, for 1998 by 24% and 19%, respectively In contrast, villages with the highest budgets, obtained a relatively lower proportional increase in their financial capital (18% and 20% respectively) Trac et al., 2013 Household income
Discussion of survey results
No Household income was maintained or increased in one study site, decreased in another, while the change was irrelevant in the third Wang et al., 2017 Household income
Tests of difference
Yes Net income is 5,59 times higher for participants than for non-participants Yang et al., 2013 Household income
Discussion of survey results
No 89% of interviewed households reported that the payments had brought more benefits (including financial) than costs to them Yin et al., 2014 Household income
Multivariate Linear Regression
Yes On average, a household there received an annual subsidy of up to 1929 yuan in 2006, accounting for 235% of its total income in that year In Sichuan subsidy was 767 yuan in 2006, equivalent to 9% of the total household income in that year 250% increase in total income The contributions of payment to farm, offfarm, and total income are all significantly positive, leading to a greater family income (coefficient 0029 (0001)***) Zheng et al., 2013 Household income
Matching
Tests of difference
Yes Participant households' agricultural income decreased by around 2000 yuan relative to non-participant, presumably from converting productive rice paddies to less lucrative cornfields The decrease in agricultural income seems to be offset by an increase in migrant earnings relative to non-participants of >3000 yuan on average Income (yuan per household): Participants 28,419 Non-participants 24,865
